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Security is considered one of the main challenges for software oriented architectures (SOA).
For this reason, several standards have been developed aroundWS-Security. However, these
security standards usually hinder interoperability, one of the main pillars of Web service
technologies. Software adaptation is a sound solution where an adaptor is deployed in the
middle of the communication to overcome signature, behavioural and QoS incompatibilities
between services. This is particularly important when dealing with stateful services (such
as Windows Workflows or WS-BPEL processes) where any mismatch in the sequence of
messages might lead the orchestration to a deadlock situation. We proposed security adap-
tation contracts as concise and versatile specifications of how such incompatibilitiesmust be
solved. Nonetheless, synthesising an adaptor compliant with a given contract is not an easy
task where concurrency issues must be kept in mind and security attacks must be analysed
and prevented. In this paper, we present an adaptor synthesis, verification and refinement
process based on security adaptation contracts which succeeds in overcoming incompati-
bilities among services and prevents secrecy attacks. We extended the ITACA toolbox for
synthesis and deadlock analysis and we integrated it with a variant of CCS, called Crypto-
CCS, to verify and refine adaptors based on partial model checking and logical satisfiability
techniques.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Security is one of the main research challenges of SOA systems [5,25]. Several standards surged to fill this gap: XML
Encryption, for performing cryptographic operations over parts of XML documents; WS-SecureConversation, to establish
secure sessions among services;WS-Trust, to assert andhandle trust betweendifferent parties;WS-SecurityPolicy, to express
the policies that are offered and required; and WS-Security, to glue it all together, to name a few members of the WS-*
specifications. However, the inclusion of these new specifications complicate the development, reuse and replaceability of
SOA systems.
Even though security is usually opposed to interoperability,Web services (WS)must be both secure and interoperable. For
this reason, we proposed security adaptation contracts [17] which, based on software adaptation techniques [10,31], specify
in a unified and concise manner how to overcome incompatibilities in interface, behaviour, and security QoS among WSs.
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the approach presented in this paper. The inputs of our synthesis process are: (i) serviceswith
incompatible behaviour and securityQoS encoded in Crypto-CCS [18] (CCS [22] extendedwith cryptographic operations); (ii)
a security adaptation contract, i.e., amappingbetween the interfacesof the serviceswhich specifieshowthe incompatibilities
must be solved and which security checks must be enforced; and (iii) a secrecy property to preserve expressed in a logical
languagewith knowledge operators. The synthesis process is structured in three sequential steps. First, a functionally-correct
adaptor is synthesised based on the given contract and services. This adaptor is able to orchestrate the services in a way
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Fig. 1. Overview of the synthesis of secure adaptors.
that it solves their initial incompatibilities. However, the adapted systemmight be insecure against secrecy attacks. For this
reason, we verify if the synthesised adaptor and the given services are robust with regard to the given secrecy property in a
second step. Finally, if an attack exists, we proceed to refine the initial adaptor into a secure adaptor. Hence, the output of the
synthesis process presented in this paper is an adaptor encoded in Crypto-CCS, able to orchestrate the services despite their
incompatibilities, compliant with the security adaptation contract (which allows a fine-grained control over the result) and
robust against secrecy attacks.
1.1. Functionally-correct adaptors
Security adaptation contracts describe the adaptors that must be deployed in themiddle of the communication between
incompatible services to allow their successful interaction avoiding deadlocks and livelocks. Stateful services (such as Win-
dowsWorkflows [27] orWS-BPEL [4] processes) are particularly prone to these undesired situations. An adaptation contract
defines amapping between the operations (and arguments) of the services, and the restrictions thatmust be obeyed to fulfil
the functional and security requirements.
The process to obtain an adaptor process P conforming to a given contract is called adaptor synthesis. The idea is to
synthesise an adaptor compliant with a contract in such a way that the parallel composition (denoted with the operator ‘‖’)
between the adaptor and the services S always reaches a satisfactory state.
P‖S always reaches a final/stable state (1)
At this point, P is a security adaptor process in the sense that it successfully reads and recomposes the cryptographic
messages exchanged between services. These messages contain parts where different cryptographic operations have been
applied. Encryption (symmetric and asymmetric), signature and hashing complicate the adaptor task as it has to be able to
decrypt, verify, and re-encrypt messages as expected by the destination service. This message manipulation is described in
the adaptation contract.
1.2. Secure adaptors
A security adaptor process satisfying (1) might not yet be secure. Although it manipulates cryptographic messages, it
does not guarantee that this manipulation prevents the disclosure of private information. Therefore, in addition to being
able tomanipulate cryptographicmessages according to the security adaptation contract, wewould like the adapted system
to be resilient against secrecy attacks or, in other words, the adapted systemmust not disclose sensitive information during
its communications. This is expressed in the following equation:
X s.t. P‖S‖X | psec (2)
where ‘|’ is the logical satisfiability operator, psec is the logical formula which represents the secrecy attack to avoid and X
is the possible attacker. As an example, psec can represent that the attacker X is able to eavesdrop the credit card number of
S during its communication with P.
There are multiple attack scenarios and (2) denotes a general one where the network is under the control of the attacker.
In this case, P cannot enforce any security on it because X can, among other things, completely isolate the adapted system S
from the adaptor process P. Other scenarios can be envisioned depending on the actual deployment setting and the different
zones of trust (see Fig. 2). In fact, we could want to restrict the power of the attacker in a way that the adaptor serves as a
gateway to our system. Using the restriction operator (\L), (2) could be concretised into the following equation:
X s.t. (P‖S)\L‖X | psec (3)
In (3), the attacker is still able to eavesdrop on any communication in the system but it can only actively participate in
those channels not present in L. Language L does not need to be the complete set of actions between S and P. If L is empty,
we revert to (2) and, if L contains every channel of S and P, then we are modelling passive attackers, i.e., attackers which can
only eavesdrop but not actively participate in the communication.
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Fig. 2. Scenarios for secure security adaptation.
We can further restrict the power of the attacker by limiting on which actions he can eavesdrop. In this case, a hiding
operator (\ L′) is used to denote the actionswhich cannot be accessed nor eavesdropped by the attacker. In addition, we only
need the synchronisations made within the system so we can restrict the whole expression with the complete language
of actions (\L′′). Let us highlight the fact that neither \L or \ L′ have to cover the complete language of actions or, in other
words, a single service can have different actions in each of the different layers of isolation from the attacker. This flexibility
allows us to model scenarios which range from attacks where the attacker controls the network (including insider attacks)
to the more limited external attackers.
Summing up all the previous points, we reach our final equation where the attacker might initially know some informa-
tion φ.
X s.t. ((P‖S)\ L′\L‖Xφ)\L′′ | psec (4)
The goal of this paper is to synthesise an adaptor process P satisfying (4) and compliant with a given security adaptation
contract.
1.3. Motivational example
Let us consider two servicesQ and Rwhich send certain data to a third service S. On the one hand, serviceQ sends the data
along with its message authentication code (mac) in a single message with the following type: send_hash!Data,Hash(Data,
Secret). The mac is the hash value (i.e., the result of a hash function where it is unfeasible to obtain its inverse) of the
couple consisting of the data plus a secret. Both services previously shared that secret. On the other hand, service R uses
asymmetric encryption to guarantee its integrity and secrecy using the following message: send_enc!AEnc(Pk(Key),Data).
The data is encrypted using the public key (Pk(Key)) of the destination service. Finally, service S is the intended recipient of
both messages but service S lacks any security infrastructure and the only message that it understands is receive?Data.
In this scenario, we need an adaptor P with a secure channel with S which intercepts the messages coming from Q and
R, verifies their integrity and forwards them to S. Adaptor P provides service S with a unified-integrity and destination-
authenticity mechanism, as it understand both mac and public-key protocols.
Such an adaptor P satisfies (1). However, we now want to enforce a property p such that “the data received by S is
confidential outside P‖S”. In this case, we obtain an attacker X (3) that eavesdrop channel send_hash, in which the data are
sent as clear text. However, if L enforces the attacker to interact only through P to reach S, the adaptor could avoid the attack
by forbidding the send_hash action, only allowing send_enc. Such an adaptor satisfies (4).
In addition, security adaptation contracts are flexible enough to cope with a different scenario where the data sent by
Q and R must be the same before relaying them to the final destination, service S. This final case would be a multi-factor
authenticationmechanism (i.e., information must be authenticated in several ways at the same time) supported by adaptor
P on behalf S. This problem can be tackled also by security adaptors.
It is worth noting that security adaptors can be deployed either transparently or as another known participant in the
communication, being provided that it can intercept the communications that need adaptation. If the adaptor has all the
information required to impersonate a service (like the Secret and private Key in the previous example) the deployment
can be transparent between that service and the rest of the system. Otherwise, the services must be aware of the adaptor
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(which must posses its own credentials) and interact through it, handling trust and authentication accordingly. Security
interceptors, used in Oracle BPEL Process Manager 10g, are good examples of transparent security adaptors. In this
case, BPEL processes are defined without security and security interceptors intercept outgoing and incoming messages,
applying security to the former and verifying the security and extracting the encapsulated information in the latter.
Compared to other kinds of contracts, security adaptation contracts specify requirements over an adaptor that must be
synthesised and deployed to support the secure conversation between WSs that were initially incompatible. As contracts,
security adaptation contracts are subject to be negotiated, but this aspect is not covered in this work. In terms ofmonitoring,
security adaptation contracts represent the security policy that must be enforced onmessages intercepted by the adaptor at
run time. In the presence of security violations, the adaptor is in charge of taking the appropriatemeasures such as interrupt
every communication with the compromised service and notify the other services in the orchestration.
Main contributions:Wetake security adaptation contracts fromour earlier paper [17] (briefly introduced in Section 2) and,
in this paper, we formalise how to synthesise deadlock-free adaptors satisfying (1) and compliant with a given contract (see
Section 3). Then, in order to address scenarios such as (3), we are going to encode our synthesised adaptor into a Crypto-CCS
process. Crypto-CCS [18] is a variant of CCS [22] which uses partial model checking and logical satisfiability techniques to
verify properties such as (4). In this paper, we extend Crypto-CCS in such a way that, if an attacker exists, it returns the most
general attacker for the given system in the sense of any possible attack can be done by that attacker (see Section 4). If such
an attacker exists, then we proceed to complete our synthesis process and refine our initial adaptor by removing the last
controllable adapted action which enabled the attack (see Section 5). In this way, we finally obtain a secure security adaptor
which satisfies (4). We discuss related work in Section 6 and we finally conclude with Section 7.
2. Security adaptation
Software adaptation [10,31] is conceived as an approach to allow the proper communication of services that were initially
unable to interact due to incompatibilities at signature, behavioural or QoS levels.
Signature incompatibilities are thosewhen services present a different interface than expected. Different operation names
or incompatible type or number of arguments fall into this category. As an example, we could think of two services that, in
spite of presenting the same functionality, offer incompatible WSDL descriptions.
Behavioural incompatibilitiesarisewhen,eventhoughservicesmightoffer compatible interfaces, they imposecertainorder
in the exchange of messages that makes their orchestration unsuccessful. These kinds of incompatibilities are more evident
in stateful services such as those described as WindowsWorkflows or WS-BPEL processes. However, RESTful and JavaScript
APIs (ubiquitous nowadays) can also present these kind of incompatibilities as they have implicit control dependencies in
the form of cookies or authentication tokens that require certain actions (typically, a login) to happen before some other
(privileged) actions.
Non-functional incompatibilities are those beyond the signature and behaviour of the services. These can be further classi-
fied intoQoS incompatibilities, e.g., when the throughput of a service is expected to be higher than it is (this could be adapted,
for instance, using an adaptor to perform load-balancing with two instances of that service running in parallel), or a service
which expects in clear text what another service is sending encrypted. On top of that, we have semantic incompatibilities
like, for instance, implementing a list from a stack or using a search engine as a spell checker.
In this paper, wewill focus on behavioural adaptation extendedwith security QoS. The goal is to obtain an adaptor which
orchestrates the services avoiding deadlocks and livelocks, and it complies with the given contract and secrecy property.
2.1. Behavioural interfaces
We model service interfaces as state machines where actions are typed with (possibly structured) cryptographic con-
structors and basic types.
Definition 2.1 (Interface). An interface is a state machine (,O, s0, F,
.−→)where  are the interface actions of the service
( ⊆ IAct), O is the set of states, s0 ∈ O is the initial state, F ⊆ O are final states without outgoing transitions and.−→⊆ (O ×  × O) is the labelled transition relation.
Interface actions (∈ IAct) are denoted by their channel (∈ Chan), an exclamation mark or a question mark for output and
input actions, respectively, followed by a (possibly structured) type of the message (IAct = (Chan × {!, ?} × Types) ∪ {τ }).
Internal actions (τ ) are used to encode internal decisions such as if activities in WS-BPEL.
Consider a set of basic types (BT ∈ BT) denoted by capitalised words and a set of cryptographic constructors (F ∈ F).
Then, the set of Types is defined by the following grammar
T(∈ Types) ::= BT | F(T1, . . . , Tar(F))
where ar(F) is the number of arguments of constructor F . Typed messages are defined analogously
m(∈ Msgs) ::= x | BM | F(m1, . . . ,mar(F))
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Fig. 3. Inference system (IS) with cryptographic primitives.
where x belongs to a countable set V of message variables, BM are messages of basic type andm1, . . . ,mar(F) are messages
of type T1, . . . , Tar(F), respectively. Typed actions (∈ Act) are elements of (Chan× {!, ?} ×Msgs)∪ {τ }. Note that we use the
set of constructors F both for types and messages.
Fig. 3 defines a system IS able to infer typedmessages based on constructorsHash, Enc, AEnc and concatenation. Symbols
m,mi, k representmessagesandT, Ti, K correspond to their respective types. The inference system ISmodelshashoperations
(1), symmetric encryption and decryption (5 and 6), public-key encryption and decryption (2, 7 and 8) and concatenation
of messages (3 and 4i).
As usual, we denote by s −→∗ s′ a sequence (possibly empty) of transitions such as s α1−−→ · · · αi−→ · · · αn−−→ s′ where
αi ∈ , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Analogously, s −→+ s′ denotes a sequence of at least a transition and s τ−→∗ s′ represents a sequence
(possibly empty) of τ -labelled transitions. Finally, we will denote byO[M] the set of possible transition traces starting from
the initial state of the state machineM. Wewill represent either as t˜ or t1 · . . . · tn a trace of transitions, and t ∈ t˜ will denote
that transition t is in the trace t˜.
Example 1. Our running example is based on the interfaces of three services depicted in Fig. 4. These services present
incompatible behaviour and security. Successful termination states are filled.
Service 1 (Fig. 4a) supports two different authentication schemas: one based on hashes and a shared secret and another
based on a modification of the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol. On the one hand, the hash authentication starts
with a hash output action with the following arguments: the identification of the originating service (i.e., Id), the request
(Req), a nonce (which stands for number used once, typed Nonce) and the mac value of all the previous arguments with
regard to a previously shared Secret. From that point on, service 1 expects all the subsequent messages to be encrypted with
the concatenation of the previous nonce and secret. It can receive either a denied action (with an encrypted new nonce) or
a reply with the encrypted data. On the other hand, the public-key authentication part starts with a pk_auth output action
with the Id of service 1, the request and a nonce, all of them encrypted using the public key of service 2 (typed Pk(Key)).
This branch can also be rejected by the destination service by transmitting a denied action symmetrically encrypted with
the previous nonce. Otherwise, it expects a replywith the previous nonce and a new nonce, both encrypted with the public
key of service 1, followed by the requested data signed by service 3 and encrypted with the concatenation of both nonces.
Finally, it sends and an acknowledgement (via ack) with the received nonce encrypted with the public key of service 2.
Service 2 is represented in Fig. 4b. This service is able to provide the data corresponding to the received request. However,
it only accepts the public-key protocol therefore every request must be received encrypted with its public key and then it
replies in clear text. Service 2 has an internal choice, represented with τ -labelled transitions, which allows him to decide
whether to reply or deny the access (via no_access).
The last service (service 3 in Fig. 4c) simply encrypts with his private key all received data. Alternatively, it ends its
behaviour if it receives action exit.
2.2. Security adaptation contracts
Security adaptation contracts [17] are an evolution of the adaptor specifications presented in [8] and extended with
value-passing in [21]. The contribution of security adaptation contracts are the inclusion of cryptographic structures in the
actions which allows the receiving, verifying and composing of cryptographicmessages. Security adaptation contracts allow
contract designers to focus onmatching the semantics behind arguments and operations, and forget about concurrency and
secrecy issues. These problems are automatically addressed by the synthesis of secure adaptors presented in the rest of the
paper. Here we proceed to briefly describe security adaptation contracts.
Security adaptation contracts need to specify how to receive, verify and recompose cryptographic messages. These oper-
ations are supported by contract terms.
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Fig. 4. Interfaces of three services.
Definition 2.2 (Contract term). A contract term is an expressionmade of cryptographic constructors and annotated symbolic
parameters. Contract terms respect the following grammar
T ::= BT | P | Pk(T ) | Hash(T ) | (T1, . . . , Tn)
| Enc(T1, T2) | AEncc(T1, T2) | AEncd(T1, T2)
where BT ∈ BT and P ∈ Param is a (possibly annotated) symbolic parameter.
For the inference system of our running example (Fig. 3), the asymmetric encryption constructor needs to be annotated
with whichever one of the rules for encryption (AEncc , rule 2) or decryption (AEncd, rules 7 and 8) needs to be applied. Hash
and symmetric encryption unambiguously represent by syntax which inference rules must be applied depending on the
direction of the action and the annotation of the symbolic parameters within.
Symbolic parameters can be annotated to express how they are updated, verified and used for composing cryptographic
messages. Parameters that represent previously known values are annotated with ‘∧’. These parameters are called known
parameters. Outgoing messages typically have most of their parameters annotated as known parameters since the values
corresponding to the arguments of amessagemust be available to the adaptor before themessage is sent. Knownparameters
are also used when part of a received message should be compared to check if it is equal to some previously known data. In
order to keep track of stored values the adaptor includes an environment.
There are arguments whose value must be generated by the adaptor (such as new keys, timestamps and nonces, for
example), these are represented by parameters annotated with ‘∗’, we call these parameters instantiated parameters. Once
instantiated, the newly generated value is also stored in the environment. All other unannotated parameters are called fresh
parameters and their values will be updated in the environment when a matching message is received. Intuitively speaking,
fresh parameters are those whose values are going to be received during a communication whereas instantiated parameters
are those whose value must be created by the adaptor on its own (normally, before an output action).
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If the same parameter occurs more than once in the same contract term, all its occurrences should represent the same
value.
Example 2. Below there are three actions with contract terms. The first two are taken from Section 1.3 and the latter is part
of the running example (Example 1).
send_hash?D,Hash(D, S∧) (5)
send!D∧ (6)
denied!Enc(K∧,N∗) (7)
The input action in 5 occurs on channel send_hash and its arguments should bematched by the contract termD,Hash(D, S∧).
Such a contract term receives and stores under parameter D whatever is matched with the first argument. Then, it verifies
that the hash of both the value received in D and some previously known information S∧ (which is annotated to be known)
should be equal to whatever is received as a second argument. Remember that every occurrence of the same parameter
should represent the same value. In order to be known, the value of Smust have been either: (i) received in a previous input
action as a fresh parameter; (ii) instantiated by the adaptor in a previous output action; or (iii) part of the initial knowledge
of the adaptor. In any case, the adaptor already knew its value in order to verify the received message.
The output action in 6 states that a new message must be composed with the previously known parameter D∧ and
emitted through channel send.
Finally, the output action denied (7) encryptswith a known key (K∧) a noncewhich is generated and stored by the adaptor
(N∗).
An environment E = (θ, κ) stores the types and values represented by the parameters with two substitutions: θ which
substitutes parameters with their corresponding type and κ which replaces parameters with their known runtime value.
Environments are extended with the infix operator ‘’. For instance, κ  κ ′ represents a new substitution where substi-
tution κ ′ takes precedence over κ or, in other words, every parameter which occurs in κ ′ is replaced by the values included
in κ ′, and then substitution κ is applied on the remaining parameters.
Symbolic parameters (P ∈ Param) are evaluated by the substitutions in the environment to obtain their corresponding
types (θ(P)) and run-time values (κ(P)). However, these substitutions can be restricted to annotated parameters with a
superscript (e.g., θ f , θ∧ and θ∗ substitute only fresh, known and instantiated parameters, respectively). Function pm(T ),
which returns the set of parameters present in contract term T, can also be restricted to annotated parameters in the same
way. The transformation from contract terms (e.g., T ) to their corresponding types in the interface is denoted by [T ]θ , where
substitution θ is used to replace the parameters in T with their types (see [17] for a detailed definition of this transformation).
Contract terms can use different cryptographic constructors and inference systems provided that they unambiguously
represent which inference rules need to be applied to decompose and compose the messages.
An adaptor must react to the messages it receives. Contract terms helped to receive and send individual messages, we
now use security adaptation vectors to relate received messages to their corresponding replies from the adaptor.
Definition 2.3 (Security adaptation vector). A security adaptation vector (or vector, for short) is denoted as 〈c!T 〉, 〈c?T 〉 or
〈c?T  c′!T ′〉 where c and c′ are channels and T, T ′ are contract terms.
We can unequivocally identify each side of a vector by its direction, e.g., being v = 〈c?T  c′!T ′〉, then ?v = c?T and
!v = c′!T ′. In addition, we can naturally extend the previous operator ‘[·]·’ to obtain the interface corresponding to vector
components: [c!T ]θ  c![T ]θ .
The intuition behind vectors with two actions is that, whenever the adaptor receives an action matching the left-hand
side of the vector, it must eventually send the action in the right-hand side of the vector. Vectors with one action can be
used as needed by the adaptor. Vectors can interleave or, in other words, we can apply additional vectors between the input
and output action of a two-sided vector.
Example 3. Going back to our unified integrity example (Section 1.3), the vectors required for the adaptation are the
following:
〈send_hash?D,Hash(D, S∧)  send!D∧〉 (8)
〈send_enc?AEncd(K∧,D)  send!D∧〉 (9)
Vector (8) relates the actions (5) and (6) of Example 2. When the adaptor receives the former, it must reply with the latter.
Vector (9) first receives action send_enc and decrypts its single argument with a previously known private key K∧ (typed
Key). Rule 8 of the inference system IS (Fig. 3) is used for this decryption and its result is stored under parameter D. This is
forwarded as expected using the second half of the vector through action send.
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Security adaptation contracts can enforce some requirements over the adaptation such as “a particular message must
not be sent more than x times” or “an operation Awill be (un)available until the operation B is called”. These requirements
constrain the application order of the interactions expressed by vectors. In order to represent such high-level requirements,
adaptation contracts are state machines whose transitions are labelled with synchronisation vectors.
Definition 2.4 (Security adaptation contract). A security adaptation contract (or contract, for short) C is a state machine(
C,O, s0, F,
.−→C
)
plus an environment (θ, κ) where C is a set of security vectors, O is the set of states, s0 ∈ O is the
initial state, F ⊆ O is the set of final states, and .−→C⊆ (O × C × O) is a transition relation.
Intuitively speaking, a security adaptation contract can be understood as a mapping between the different security
policies of several services, along the information (e.g., keys and certificates) and restrictions required to support the secure
interaction between the services, despite their initial incompatibilities.
Example 4. The adaptation required to address the multi-factor authentication of Section 1.3 is solved by the following
contract and initial environment.
C = {〈send_hash?D,Hash(D, S∧)〉; (v1)
〈send_enc?AEncd(K∧,D∧)  send!D∧〉} (v2)
T = {s0 v1−−→C s1, s1 v2−−→C s0}
E = ([Data/D, Secret/S, Key/K], [s/S, k/K])
C =
((
C, {s0, s1}, s0, {s0}, T
)
, E
)
The key difference with respect to Example 3 is that we do not send the data when we receive the first message (v1) but,
instead, we wait for the second message (v2) and we check that the data received in both messages is the same to do
multi-factor authentication (using the know parameter D∧ in v2). The transition relation of the contract (T) enforces that
the vectors are applied in the order previously mentioned.
Example 5. The service interfaces of our running example can be adapted using the security adaptation contract presented
in Fig. 5.
The contract supports both the hash and public key protocols from service 1 (Fig. 4a). If service 1 decides to do the
request through hash, this is received by vector vhs. This vector allows requests coming from a service identified I and it
checks that the hash of the request (Hash(I, R,NA, S∧)) corresponds to what is received and the secret previously known by
the adaptor. Once the reception is verified, the adaptor compliant with this contract should eventually respond by sending
a request to service 2 (Fig. 4b). Such a response is composed using the received values, i.e., the nonce of service 1 (NA∧) and
the request R∧.
Service 2 might either respond with the data D with vector vrep or reject the request via 2_no_access in vdny. Either way,
it also provides the nonce NA∧ received with the request from service 1. This nonce and the secret (s1,2 which substitutes
parameter S∧) are used to encrypt and send the data to service 1 on the right-hand side of vrep. If, on the contrary, the request
is denied, what is encrypted and sent is a new nonce instantiated by the adaptor (i.e., N∗) using vector vdny.
A similar process happens if service 1 goes through the public-key protocol starting with 1_pk_auth in vector vpk . In this
case, however, the request Q is directly understood by service 2, therefore no verification or recomposition is needed from
the adaptor, hence the request is directly forwarded to service 2.
Then, service 2might deny the request (vno) or otherwise replywith the data using vector vsign. The right-hand side of this
vector delegates on service 3 (Fig. 4c) to sign it with its private key. These signed data are received in vector vok and properly
encrypted and composed to reply to service 1. Notice that the nonce which has to be instantiated composing 1_reply in vok
(i.e., NB∗), is the same for both occurrences of the symbolic parameter.
Finally, service 1will acknowledge the responsewith ACK in vack . By using simply ACK tomatch the acknowledgementwe
just receive it and ignore it. Alternatively, this message could have been verified to correspond to the previously sent nonce
NB using a contract term AEncc(KB
∧,NB∧). Such a contract term encrypts and compares because the contract environment
(θ, κ) does not posses the private key of service 2 to be able to decrypt the message with AEncd(PKB
∧,NB∧) (where PKB
should represent the private key of service 2 in the environment). Vector vext allows the adaptor to finish the behaviour of
service 3 if its signature is not needed because the orchestration went through the hash-based schema.
The adaptor compliant with the contract must intercept every communication between the adapted services. Formally,
this is modelled in service interfaces by renaming and prefixing every channel with the unique identifier of the service. For
instance, 3_exit! meaning that message exit must be sent to service 3.
The state machine of security adaptation contracts imposes the allowed sequences in which the vectors can be applied.
On any given state in the contract, a process compliant with that contract can only perform: (i) the actions of single-sided
vectors (see rule Sing in Fig. 6), (ii) input actions of two-sided vectors and then enqueue the output action for its eventual
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Fig. 5. Adaptation contract and initial environment for services 1, 2 and 3.
Fig. 6. Rules to infer a deterministic state machine (AC ) which accepts the traces compliant with contract C .
execution (Enq), and (iii) previously enqueued output actions (Deq). These restrictions imposed by contract C define another
state machine AC0 with a transition relation
·
↪−→0 using the rules Sing, Enq and Deq in Fig. 6 where Q is a multiset of queued
actions.
However, the transition system of AC0 might be non-deterministic, i.e., two (or more) states with different outgoing
transitions can be reached using the same trace.We need a statemachine AC which characterises contract C =
((
C,O, s0,
F,
.−→C) , (θ, κ)), and is deterministic at the same time. Such a state machine is obtained by powerset construction [28]
through rule Det where the alphabetA is given by sides of vectors inC (i.e.,C = (A × A) ∪ A), S = 2O×(A×N) is
the set of states, {(s0,∅)} is the initial state, and {st ∈ S | (s,∅) ∈ st ∧ s ∈ F} are the final states.
As far as we are dealing with state machines with final states, we extend the notions of simulation () from process
algebras with the restriction that final states are simulated by final states.
Definition 2.5 (Simulation). A simulation relation between the states of two given state machines A1 =
(
1,O1, s
1
0, F1, T1
)
and A2 =
(
2,O2, s
2
0, F2, T2
)
is defined as RA1,A2 ⊆ O1×O2 such that the following conditions hold for all (s1, s2) ∈ RA1,A2 :
1. For every transition (s1
α−→ s′1) ∈ T1 it must exist a transition (s2 α−→ s′2) ∈ T2 such that (s′1, s′2) ∈ RA1,A2 .
2. If s1 ∈ F1 then s2 ∈ F2.
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From the previous notion, a simulation relation can be naturally derived for state machines.
A1  A2 iff it exists a RA1,A2 such that (s10, s20) ∈ RA1,A2
where s10 and s
2
0 are the initial states of A1 and A2, respectively.
It is trivial that AC accepts the same traces as AC0 and A
C
0  AC .
2.3. Adaptors
Adaptors are the realisation of contracts for a given set of services. Adaptors are equipped with an environment which
is updated at run time to perform the exchange of messages and its behaviour is customised to avoid deadlocks among the
services while complying with the contract at the same time.
Definition 2.6 (Adaptor). An adaptor A compliant with a contract C is a deterministic state machine such that A  AC .
We will omit the contract C when it is clear from the context.
By substituting every contract term by its corresponding type in every transition of the adaptor we obtain the adaptor in-
terface. Because both the adaptor and its interface share the same set of states and both are deterministic, it is straightforward
to obtain an equivalence relation between their states and transitions.
Given an adaptor A =
(
A,O, s0, F,
.
↪−→
)
compliant with a contract whose type substitution is θ , its interface is given by
ia(A), defined as follows:
ia(A)  (,O, s0, F, T) (ia)
where
 = {[α]θ | α ∈ A} and T =
{
s
[ α]θ−−−→ s′ | s α↪−→ s′
}
Given an adaptor A as above and an interface I =
(
I,OI, sI0, F
I,
·−→
)
, we can define the inverse function of ia as follows:
ia
−1
A (I) 
(
A,OI, sI0, F
I, T ′
)
(ia
−1
A )
where
T ′ = {s α↪−→ s′ | s α↪−→ s′ ∧ s [α]θ−−−→ s′}
As we will discuss later, the synthesis process presented in this paper depends on these two mappings. In fact, we need
ia to preserve the determinism of adaptors, keeping a tree structure on the generated interfaces.
Proposition 2.1. Given an adaptor A compliant with a contract C, ia(A) is a deterministic interface. In addition, if the transition
relation of C presents a tree structure, then ia(A) also presents a tree structure.
On the other hand, the complementary relationship between ia and ia
−1
A (as inverse mappings) is justified by following
result.
Proposition 2.2. Given an adaptor A compliant with a contract whose type substitution is θ then
I  ia(A) ⇒ ia−1A (I)  A
We have not yet defined the operational semantics among services and adaptors to really understand what their parallel
composition is. In order to do that we require an operational semantics which allows the carrying out of security checks and
cryptographic operations specified in theadaptation contracts andfinally verify that certain securityproperties arepreserved
by the orchestration. We will properly define the operational semantics in Section 4 when we need all its details for the
verification but, for the time being, we can understand the parallel composition between adaptor and service interfaces
similarly as in CCS [22].
s1
α−→ s′1 s2 α¯−→ s′2
s1 ⊗ s2 τ−→ s′1 ⊗ s′2
s
α−→ s′
s ⊗ s1 α−→ s′ ⊗ s1
We denote by α¯ an action with the same channel and type as α but with complementary direction. Communications are
synchronous. We have omitted the symmetric rule for ‘⊗’. Configuration s0 ⊗ s′0 is the initial state of the composition. A
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Fig. 7. Adaptor for services 1, 2 and 3, compliant with contract C .
configuration s ⊗ s′ of the transition system given by s0 ⊗ s′0 is a final state of the composition if s and s′ are final states of
their respective service interfaces.
We say that an adaptor A is an adaptor for services S if the parallel composition between the adaptor and the services does
not present deadlocks or livelocks.
Definition 2.7 (Deadlock). An interface presents a deadlock situation if it arrives to a state where it cannot reach a final state.
More formally, there exists a deadlock state s such that s0
τ−→∗ s and s′ ∈ F s.t. s τ−→∗ s′.
The previous definition covers both deadlocks and livelocks because it guarantees that every state can eventually reach
a final state through τ -labelled transitions. For the rest of this paper, we will only mention deadlocks as a general term
including livelocks as well.
The operator ‘⊗’ is the composition operator among interfaces as opposed to the parallel composition between Crypto-
CCS processes, presented in Section 4. However, for deadlock analysis purposes, we can extrapolate the results obtained
using interfaces being given Lemma 4.1, which claims that two interfaces synchronise if their corresponding Crypto-CCS
processes synchronise.
Example 6. The adaptor in Fig. 7 is compliant with the security adaptation contract C in Fig. 5 and successfully adapts the
three services in Fig. 4 independently of their internal choices and supporting both authentication schemas. The actions
are prefixed (and formally renamed with) the identification of the communicating service. Because contract vectors (C )
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contain adaptor actions (i.e., C ⊆ (A × A) ∪ A), we have represented adaptor actions with the direction and vector
that contains them in the contract. For instance, ?vrep represents the input action of vector vrep, i.e., 2_reply?NA
∧,D. Several
transitions labelled !vext are dashed because they represent same interactions as solid transitions but with occurrences of!vext at different points in the trace. The reason for this is that, once service 1 decides to go through the hash authentication
schema, we can finish the session with service 3 using vector vext at any time, thus the interleaving.
3. Synthesis of functionally-correct security adaptors
Cryptography is an orthogonal aspect to functionality. If therewere no security attacks,malicious users and distrust, there
would be no need for cryptography. For this reason, we are going to approach the synthesis process by abstracting away the
security or, in other words, we forget about the cryptographic inference system, security checks and symbolic parameters
presented so far and focus only on the interfaces of the services and the adaptor. We can do that to a certain level thanks to
Lemma 4.1.
In this context, functional correctness means contract compliance and absence of deadlocks. However, deadlock free-
dom cannot always be preserved in the presence of active attackers. For example, an attacker could interrupt any further
communication therefore leaving the system in a deadlock state. Because of this, our goal for functional correctness is to pre-
serve deadlock freedom in the absence of active attackers. In this way, wemight synthesise an insecure functionally-correct
adaptor but, in Section 5, we will refine such adaptor into a secure one.
There are several approaches [7,9,10,21,24] in the literature to the synthesis of behavioural adaptors with similar prop-
erties of functional correctness. However, these approaches do not support cryptographic messages which must be crypto-
graphically processed on receptions and emissions. Although these related papers could be extended to manipulate crypto-
graphic messages, they still synthesise functionally-correct yet insecure adaptors. This means that the synthesised adaptors
succeed in exchanging messages avoiding deadlocks but they might do so in a way that sensitive information remains
insecure and therefore the adapted system is vulnerable to secrecy attacks.
Alternatively to the solution proposed below, it is possible to use these related approaches by first transforming the
problem into an equivalent one without security, synthesise the functionally-correct adaptor using traditional approaches,
transformback the result into an adaptorwith security, and then proceed to the verification and refinement stages described
in this paper. The ITACA toolbox1 supports this alternative approach and it allows the visualisation, simulation and analysis
of behavioural adaptation contracts. For further details on this alternative procedure, please consult Appendix C .
Building on this previous work, we now proceed to illustrate how to synthesise functionally-correct adaptors able to
manipulate cryptographic messages (whose parts might be encrypted or digested, for instance). For now, we will focus on
contract compliance and deadlock freedom, therefore the adaptor synthesised at the end of this section is still insecure with
regard to the secrecy property to preserve. In Section 5, we complete this process by taking advantage of the verification
mechanism presented in Section 4 so thatwe can reuse the functions formalised in this section to refine functionally-correct
adaptors into secured ones.
The synchronisations between services and an adaptor depend on three conditions:
Signature matching: Actions with complementary direction but identical types occurring on the same channel. This can be
reduced to comparing transitions in the adaptor interface with those in the service interface and check that are comple-
mentary, i.e., same channel, same type and different direction.
Contract compliance: The contract allows synchronisation. In other words, each synchronisation between a service and the
adaptor corresponds to one of the AC transitions. This condition can be understood as a control dependency.
Parameter dependencies: The adaptor has the information required to perform the synchronisation. These are the implicit
dependencies among the symbolic parameters in contract terms. An example of this second sort of dependencies is that, if
a certain parameter is annotated to be known in a contract term (i.e., it is needed to process that contract term) the value
corresponding to that parameter should be present in the initial environment or must have been received in advance in a
previous transition. The value of a parameter is obtained on input actions where the parameter is annotated to be fresh,
or in an output action when the parameter is annotated to be instantiated. In the latter case the value is generated by the
adaptor. These are data dependencies.
3.1. Data dependencies
We can avoid dealing with parameter dependencies as these can be made explicit in the contract. In order to do that, we
refine any given contract into an equivalent one with the dependencies included using the rule Dep in Fig. 8.
A contract C =
((
C,O, s0, F,
.−→C
)
, E
)
, where E = (θ, κ), is transformed by rule Dep into another contract
CE =
((
C,O′, s′0, F ′,
.−→C
)
, E
)
1 Available at http://itaca.gisum.uma.es/.
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Fig. 8. Rule to make explicit parameter dependencies.
where
O′ =
(
O × 2Param
)
; s′0 = (s0,Dom(κ)) ; F ′ =
(
F × 2Param
)
In every reachable stateofCE , it is guaranteed that the adaptor knows the runtimevaluesneeded for the following transitions.
We have overloaded function pm to be applicable to vectors, e.g., pm∧(〈c?T  c′!T ′〉) = pm∧(T ) ∪ pm∧(T ′).
Lemma 3.1. The contract transformation given by rule Dep satisfies that:
• Every adaptor compliant to CE is also compliant to C.
• For every trace of CE such as s0 v0−−→C . . . si vi−→C si+1 vi+1−−−→C it holds that
pm∧(vi+1) ⊆ Dom(κE) ∪
j=i⋃
j=0
pmf (vj) ∪ pm∗(vj)
3.2. Control dependencies
Now, we have to deal with contract compliance and interface matching. Assuming that the original contract was C0 and
we obtained C = CE0 with explicit parameter dependencies, we are now going to work on a deterministic AC , which is
the state machine which characterises contract C. We start by using A0 = AC as an initial approximation to the adaptor.
However, A0 might present deadlocks when it orchestrates the services, so we are going to do a deadlock analysis on its
adaptor interface and prune the controllable branches that cause those deadlocks. This pruning process only works if ia(AC)
is a tree. This, however, can be easily imposed explicitly by the contract or implicitly by modifying rule DEP in a way that
every generated contract state is a unique state.
Given the service interface S with an initial state sS0, the deadlock analysis proceeds as follows. We define an iterative
synthesis process over a candidate adaptor interface Ii =
(
,O, si0, F, Ti
)
by selecting a transition t = s α−→ s′ ∈ Ti such that:
sS0 ⊗ s0 τ−→
∗
s1 ⊗ s τ−→+ s′1 ⊗ s′
for some s′1 where s′1 ⊗ s′ is a deadlock state and s1 α¯−→ τ−→
∗
s′1, and considering a new adapter interface given by:
Ii+1 = prune(S, Ii, s α−→ s′)
where function prune (defined below) removes the given transition t from Ii without creating new deadlocks. The initial
candidate is I0 = ia(A0) and we iterate while a transition t exists satisfying the above mentioned conditions.
It is not possible to synthesise the adaptor if any of the prune(S, Ii, t) is undefined or if s
S
0 ⊗ sn0 still presents deadlocks at
the end of this process; in either case we return an empty adaptor. Otherwise, A = ia−1A0 (In) is an adaptor for S. The reason
to check deadlock absence again at the end of the process is that, in some cases, deadlock situations are inherent to service
interface S and, no matter howmany times we prune the adaptor interface I, the interface Smight still reach a deadlock. For
example, a service interface S with no final states.
Function prunemust remove a transition leading to the given transition in away that it does not cause anymore deadlocks
in the process. It must be a deadlock-free pruning. Because of this, we have to check that the transition to remove has a sibling
and it is a controllable decision, i.e., the adaptor can control which of those branches is followed by the services. This
controllability check is done by function prunable. Function prune is formally defined over a tree-like state machine I as
follows.
Definition 3.1 (Deadlock-free pruning). Given an interface S with initial state sS0, an interface I =
(
,O, s0, F , T
)
, and a
transition t ∈ T , function prune(S, I, t) defines a new interface (,O, s0, F, T ′) where the new transition relation is given
by:
T ′ = {u ∈ T | ∃u˜ ∈ O[I].u ∈ u˜ ∧ t′ ∈ u˜}
if there exists t′ ∈ P = prunable(S, I) such that exists a trace in O[I] where t′ precedes t, and for each of these traces
· · · t′ · t˜ · t · · · ∈ O[I], t˜ ∩ P = ∅. If it does not exist such a transition t′, we consider that prune(S, I, t) is undefined
(represented as ⊥).
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Function prunable is defined as:
prunable(S, I)  {s α−→ s′ ∈ T | ∀u . sS0 ⊗ s0 τ−→
∗
u ⊗ s
∃β = α . s β−→ ∧ u τ−→∗ β¯−→ and
∀v . u τ−→+ v , v  α¯−→ }
Function prunable returns the set of transitions that can be removed from the adaptorwithout generating new deadlocks.
Prunable transitions must have a sibling transition (s
β−→) so that the execution can continue through an alternative branch
and, in addition, it must be a controllable choice of the adaptor, i.e., none of the services can internally require the prunable
action at the parent state (v  α¯−→).
It is worth noting thatmapping prune is well defined because if t′ exists, it is clearly unique. In addition, the proposed iter-
ative process, which builds a sequence of interfaces {Ii}i=0...n, is also well defined, in spite of the apparent non-determinism
exhibited by the selection of the transition ti in each step. In fact, the process is independent of the pruning order. This is
what the following proposition states.
Proposition 3.1. Function prune is independent of the pruning order. More formally, given two interfaces S and I, and two
transitions t1 and t2 in I, we have:
prune(S, prune(S, I, t1), t2) = prune(S, prune(S, I, t2), t1)
This proposition allows us to univocally define the adaptor C[S] (possibly empty) generated by this pruning process as
follows:
C[S] 
{
(∅,∅,⊥,∅,∅) if In =⊥
ia
−1
AC
(In) otherwise
where In is the last interface produced by the iterative process and I0 = ia(AC).
In order to demonstrate that prune behaves as expected first we prove that a pruned adaptor is still and adaptor, and then
the main result of this section will prove that the synthesis process returns adaptors for the given services, if it converges to
a non empty adaptor.
Lemma 3.2. For any service interface S and any transition t of an adaptor A, if prune(S, ia(A), t) =⊥ then
ia
−1
A (prune (S, ia(A), t))  A
and prune(S, ia(A), t) is deterministic.
Now, we can prove that, given a contract, the iterative pruning process for a certain interface (representing services)
returns either an empty adaptor or an adaptor for those services, compliant with the contract.
Theorem 3.1. Given a contract C, the iterative pruning process for a certain interface S, providing the sequence of interfaces
{Ii}i=0...n (with I0 = ia(AC)), satisfies that if In =⊥ then ia−1AC (In) is an adaptor for services S compliant with contract C.
4. Verification
We synthesised a functionally-correct adaptor compliant to a contract in Section 3. However, the contract was conceived
to support andmediate between the security protocols of the services and these protocols might preserve different security
properties. In this section, we will analyse the security implications of including an adaptor in the system and we will
specifically verify that the adapted system globally preserves a given secrecy property, even in presence of attackers.
4.1. The attacker
Recalling the discussion in Section 1, if we consider that the attacker controls the network, the attacker could completely
bypass the adaptor and directly communicate with the services, isolating the adaptor from the system.
X s.t. P‖S‖X | psec (2)
In this case, the adaptor process P is in no position to enforce any security because the attacker X can intercept every
communication with service S, therefore the only kind of security property that the adaptor can control is that it does
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not makes things worse. For example, we can guarantee that the adaptor does not disclose sensitive information to an
unauthorised party.
Alternatively, if we can assume that certain channels cannot be actively manipulated (with \L) or eavesdropped (with
\ L′) by the attacker, the adaptor can be used as a gateway or a firewall to sensitive services. In this scenario, we might want
to verify security properties regarding the resilience of the interface offered by the adaptor to the attacker. These are external
attackers.
X s.t. ((P‖S)\ L′\L‖Xφ)\L′′ | psec (4)
The reason for the restriction on L′′ is thatwe only care about the possible synchronisations between the different parties,
and this is achieved by including every channel of the system in L′′.
In between the previous two kinds of attacks, and also covered by (4), we have insider attacks. These are attacks where
the intruder has certain privileged knowledge (φ) and some of the services in the system trust it.
It is time to present the formal operational semantics which allow us to simulate and verify security-enabled services.
We need to (i) be able to model the knowledge of the different parties (so that we can model insider attacks), (ii) reason on
the communications between services and what can be inferred from them using our cryptographic inference system, and
(iii) specify restrictions on the power of the attacker, so we can distinguish external from network attackers.
For this purpose, we are going to encode our services and adaptors into Crypto-CCS [18] processes. The operational
semantics of Crypto-CCS can be parameterisedwith the cryptographic inference system IS in Fig. 3 and support our previous
assumption about action synchronisations (Lemma 4.1).
4.2. Crypto-CCS
Crypto-CCS [18] is a tool-supported [20]process calculus inspiredbyCCS [22]butextendedwithguardsandparameterised
with an inference system to perform cryptographic operations.
Crypto-CCS processes are described by the following grammar:
S ::= S\L | S\ L | S1‖S2 | Aφ
A ::= 0 | pc.A | A1 + A2 | [m = m′]A1; A2|
[〈〈mi〉〉i∈I IS x : T]A1; A2
pc ::= τ | c!m | c?x : T | χ xc,T
wherem,m′,m1, . . . ,mn are messages or variables, x is a message variable, T is a (possibly structured) type, c ∈ Chan is a
channel, φ is a finite set of typed messages, L is a subset of Chan and i ∈ I ⊆ N (the set of natural numbers).
We briefly give the informal semantics of the terms of the calculus.
• 0 is the process that does nothing.
• pc.A is the process that can perform an action according to the particular prefix construct pc and then behaves as A:
– c!m allows the messagem to be sent on channel c.
– c?x : T allows messagesm : T to be received on channel c. The message received substitutes the variable x.
– χ xc,T is used to eavesdrop a communication on channel c which occurs in other sub-components of the system. The
eavesdropped message substitutes the variable x.
• A1 + A2 is the process that non-deterministically decides to behave as A1 or A2. It is worth noting that this operator can
be used to model both internal choices (e.g., τ.A1 + τ.A2) and external choices (e.g., c1?x : T1.A1 + c2?x : T2.A2 being
c1 = c2).• [m = m′]A1; A2 is the matching construct. If the two messages are equal to each other, then the process behaves as A1,
otherwise as A2.• [〈〈mi〉〉i∈I IS x : T]A1; A2 is the inference construct. If, applying a case of inference schema IS with the premises〈〈mi : Ti〉〉i∈I , a message m : T can be inferred, then the process behaves as A1 (where x is replaced with m); otherwise
the process behaves as A2. This is the message-manipulating construct of the calculus: we can build a new message by
using the messages in 〈〈mi〉〉i∈I and the inference rule IS.• The system S \ L is prevented from performing actions whose channel belongs to the set L, except for synchronisation.
• The system S\ L can perform actions not in L, in addition synchronisations whose channels are in L are renamed into τ .
• A compound system S‖S1 performs an action a if either of its sub-components performs a, and a synchronisation action
(τc,m), if the sub-components perform complementary actions, i.e., send-receive actions. It is worth noticing that, unlike
CCS, our synchronisation actions carry information about the message exchanged and the channel used. In this way, we
can model eavesdropping. Indeed, the agents of one component, e.g. S, might know the message exchanged during the
synchronisation of the other component, i.e., S1, by simultaneously performing an eavesdropping action χ .
Guarded actions (i.e., [m = m′]A1; A2 and [〈〈mi〉〉i∈I IS x : T]A1; A2) have a second process A2 which is executed when the
guard does not hold. From now on, we assume that guards which do not hold are security failures in which the process must
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Table 1
Operational semantics of Crypto-CCS, where the symmetric rules for ‖1, ‖2 and ‖χ are left omitted.
(!)
(c!m.A)φ c!m−→ (A)φ
(?)
m : T ∈ Tmsgs(T)
(c?x : T .A)φ c?m−→ (A[m/x])φ∪{m : T}
(χ)
m : T ∈ Tmsgs(T)
(χ xc,T .A)φ
χc,m−→ (A[m/x])φ∪{m : T}
(τ )
(τ.A)φ
τ−→ (A)φ
([]1) m = m
′ (A1)φ
α−→ (A′1)φ′
([m = m′]A1; A2)φ α−→ (A′1)φ′
([]2) m = m
′ (A2)φ
α−→ (A′2)φ′
([m = m′]A1; A2)φ α−→ (A′2)φ′
(+1) (A1)φ
α−→ (A′1)φ′
(A1 + A2)φ α−→ (A′1)φ′
(+2) (A2)φ
α−→ (A′2)φ′
(A1 + A2)φ α−→ (A′2)φ′
(D1) 〈〈mi : Ti〉〉i∈I IS m : T (A1[m/x])φ∪{m : T}
α−→ (A′1)φ′
([〈〈mi〉〉i∈I IS x : T]A1; A2)φ α−→ (A′1)φ′
(D2)(m : T)〈〈mi : Ti〉〉i∈I IS m : T (A2)φ
α−→ (A′2)φ′
([〈〈mi〉〉i∈I IS x : T]A1; A2)φ α−→ (A′2)φ′
(‖1) S
α−→ S′
S‖S1 α−→ S′‖S1
(‖2) S
c?m−→ S′ S1 c!m−→ S′1
S‖S1 τc,m−→ S′‖S′1
(‖χ ) S
τc,m−→ S′ S1 χc,m−→ S′1
S‖S1 τc,m−→ S′‖S′1
(\ L1) S
τc,m−→ S′ c ∈ L
S\ L τ−→ S′\ L (\ L2)
S
τc,m−→ S′ c ∈ L
S\ L τc,m−→ S′\ L
(\ L3) S
α−→ S′ α = τc,m channel(α) ∈ L
S\ L α−→ S′\ L (\L1)
S
α−→ S′ channel(α) ∈ L
S\L α−→ S′\L
perform exceptional actions. These actions could trigger alarms, perform counter-attacks or tighten the security, among
others. In this paper we will simply halt the process on security failures, therefore A2 is always the empty process (0). Let
us note that these security failures are not violations of the secrecy property, they only mean that somemessages are not as
expected (e.g., a message which has been tampered or a key which is not correct).
For the sakeof clarity,wewill omitmessage types inCrypto-CCSprocesswhen they canbeeasily inferred fromthecontext.
The operational semantics of Crypto-CCS is described in Table 1. Function Tmsgs(T) represents the set of all possible
messages of type T . The auxiliary function channel returns the channel of the given action.
channel(τc,m) = channel(τ ) =⊥
channel(c?x : T) = channel(c!m) = channel(χ xc,T ) = c
The complete description of Crypto-CCS [18] supports actions to generate random values. This random value generation
is used for instantiated parameters in adaptation contracts. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will assumewithout loss
of generality that every random value needed is initially known by the agent. In this way, we can safely replace instantiated
parameters by known parameters in our adaptation contracts.
Example 7. Figure 9 shows possible Crypto-CCS processes for services 1, 2 and 3.
The eavesdropping action χ xc,T is not meant to be used by well-behaved services but only by the attacker. The service
interface of well-behaved Crypto-CCS processes is obtained through the following definition.
Definition 4.1. The interface of a Crypto-CCS process P which does not eavesdrop is given by ip(P)  (, S, s0, F, .−→)
where the states S are the possible configurations of P, state s0 = P, F = {0} and the alphabet  is obtained from the
transition system
.−→, which is inferred as follows.
P
c!m−−→ P′ m : T
P
c!T−−→ P′
P
c?m−−→ P′ m : T
P
c?T−−→ P′
P
τc,m−−−→ P′
P
τ−→ P′ τ.P τ−→ P
We are now in condition to formalise Lemma 4.1 which matches the synchronisations between Crypto-CCS processes to
those of their corresponding interfaces. We used this lemma extensively in Section 3 where we presented deadlock analysis
and the synthesis of functionally-correct adaptors based on service interfaces. The following lemma allows us to extrapolate
those results to Crypto-CCS processes.
Lemma 4.1. Two Crypto-CCS processes which do not eavesdrop synchronise iff their corresponding interfaces synchronise. More
formally,
P‖Q α−→ P′‖Q ′, α ∈ {τc,m, τ } iff ip(P) ⊗ ip(Q) τ−→ ip(P′) ⊗ ip(Q ′)
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Fig. 9. Crypto-CCS processes for the services of the running example.
Security adaptors (e.g.,A compliantwith a contractwhose environment is E) for service interfaces of Crypto-CCSprocesses
can be encoded into Crypto-CCS processes (denoted AE) using the procedure described in Appendix B . It consists on a
recursive procedurewhich encodes receptions, then it recomposes themessages usingpreviously knownand received values
and it compares the newly composed message with what was received to check that the message was as expected. Output
messages are composed and sent without such comparison.
Example 8. Figure 7b shows part of the Crypto-CCS process corresponding to the adaptor for the running example. The
branch corresponding to the public key authentication has been omitted for the sake of clarity. All the expressions needed
to perform the security checks in the adaptor are highlighted in red and bold.
4.3. Verifying security adaptors
Note that such properties as (4) look like validity statements of mathematical logic, i.e.:
∀X X | p (10)
where the formula p must be checked for every structure X . The main difference is that in (4) we check the components X
in combination with a system S (including the adaptor process and the restrictions of (4)).
We can reduce such a verification problem as (4) to such a validity checking problem as (10). To obtain this, we apply and
extend the partial model checking techniques used for the compositional verification of concurrent systems (see [3]).
Consider a system S in combination with a process X and try to figure out if the whole system S‖X enjoys a property
expressed by a formula p or not. Then, partial model checking techniques can be used to find the sufficient and necessary
condition on X , expressed by a logical formula pS , so the whole system S‖X satisfies p. In short, we have:
S‖X | p iff X | pS (11)
Using the property (11), such verification problems as in (4) can be easily reduced to such problems as in (10).
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Table 2
Semantics of the logical language.
S | T, for every process S
S | F, for no process S
S | ∧i∈I Fi iff ∀i ∈ I . S | Fi
S | ∨i∈I Fi iff ∃i ∈ I . S | Fi
S | 〈a〉F iff ∃S′ . S a−→ S′ and S′ | F
S | [a]F iff ∀S′ . S a−→ S′ implies S′ | F
S | m ∈ KφX,γ iff ∀S′ s.t. (S γ⇒ S′) ↓X= γ ′ and m : T ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′))
S | ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ iff ∃γ . S | m ∈ KφX,γ
4.4. A language to describe protocol properties
We illustrate a logical language (LK ) for the specification of the functional and security properties of a compound system.
Language LK was presented in [18] and it is an extended normal multimodal logic with operators which make it possible to
specify whether a message belongs to an agent’s knowledge after a computation γ performed by the whole system, starting
from a fixed initial knowledge. The syntax of the logical language LK is defined by the following grammar:
F ::=T | F |〈a〉F |[a]F | ∧i∈IFi | ∨i∈IFi |m ∈ KφX,γ | ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ
where a ∈ Act,m is amessage, X is an agent identifier, I is an index set (possibly infinite) andφ a finite set of typedmessages.
The language withoutm ∈ KφX,γ and ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ (“knowledge” operators) is called L.
Informally, T and F are the true and false logical constants; the 〈a〉F modality expresses the possibility to perform an
action a and then satisfy F . The [a]F modality expresses the necessity that, after performing an action a, the system satisfies
F;∨i∈I (∧i∈I) represents the logical disjunction (conjunction). As usual, we consider∨i∈∅ (∧i∈∅) as F (T). A system S satisfies
a formula m ∈ KφX,γ if S can perform a computation γ of actions and an agent of S, identified by X , can infer the message
m starting from the set of messages φ plus the messages it has come to know during the computation γ . The formula
∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ is satisfied by a system S if there exists a computation γ and an agent X of S s.t. Xφ can infer m during the
computation γ .
We assume that a unique identifier can be assigned to every sequential agent in a compound system (e.g., the path from
the root to the sequential agent term in the parsing tree of the compound system term). Then, given a sequence of transitions
S
γ⇒ S′ of a compound term S, let (S γ⇒ S′) ↓X be the sequence of actions of the agent identified by X in S, that have
contributed to the transitions of the whole system.2 Finally, the formal semantics of a formula F ∈ LK w.r.t. a compound
system S is inductively defined in Table 2. Functionmsgs(γ ) returns all the messages occurring in the trace γ and function
D(φ) returns the set of typed messages which can be inferred (through the rules in Fig. 3) from knowledge φ.
Proposition 4.1. Given a system S and an agent Xφ where φ is finite and Sort(S‖X) ⊆ L, then if m is an initial message we have:
(S‖Xφ)\L | ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ iff Xφ | ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S.
We use the formula ∃γ .m ∈ KφX,γ to check if there exists a possible intruder that can discover some confidential values
while interacting with the services and the adaptor protocol. We proceed as in the previous case, now assuming that the
adaptor protocol is also part of the system to be analysed. This time we use a partial model checking function as described
in [18] and recalled in Table 3.
Proposition 4.2. Consider the formula F = ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S. Then it is decidable whether or not a model X of such formula
exists.
4.5. The most general attacker
The process XF constructed by following the proof steps of Proposition 4.2 is maximal, i.e., any attack performed by the
intruder can be performed by the one developed in the proof. Indeed, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4.3. Given a system S. Assume that an agent Xφ , with a finite φ and Sort(S‖X) ⊆ L, then if m is an initial message
and ((S‖X) \ L γ⇒ S1) ↓X= γ ′ and m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′)) and m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′′), for any γ ′′ strict prefix of γ ′, then
2 For simplification, here we leave out the technical details. We can however achieve this result by suitably adding information on the transitions, e.g., see [12].
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Table 3
Partial evaluation function for (S‖X) \ L, with Sort(S‖X) ⊆ L, and ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ .
∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S .=∨
(c,m′,S′)∈Send(S) 〈c!m′〉(∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S′) (sending) ∨∨
S
c!m′−→S′ 〈c?m
′〉(∃γ . m ∈ Kφ∪{m′}X,γ //S′) (receiving) ∨∨
S
τ
c,m′−→S′
〈χc,m′ 〉(∃γ . m ∈ Kφ∪{m
′}
X,γ //S
′) (eaves−dropping) ∨∨
S
a−→S′(a=τc,m,τ ) ∃γ . m ∈ K
φ
γ //S
′ (idling) ∨
m ∈ KφX,//S (nothing to do)
m ∈ KφX,//S .= ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //Nil .=
{
T m ∈ D(φ)
F m ∈ D(φ)
where :
Send(S) = {(c,m′, S′)|S c?m′−→ S′ and m′ ∈ D(φ)}
also ((S‖XF) \ L γ⇒ S2) ↓XF= γ ′ and m ∈ D(φ ∪msgs(γ ′)), where XF is the process obtained in the proof of Proposition 4.2
for the formula F = ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S.
Example 9. For our running example and considering that φ = {Pk(ka), Pk(kb), i} is public information, if we want
the request coming from service 1 (r1) to be secret to third parties (secrecy property psec = ∃γ . r1 ∈ KφX,γ ), then by
Proposition 4.2 we obtain an attacker X = hash?x + χhash,x able to violate psec . Formally, (S‖P‖X)\L | psec being L ⊇
Sort(S‖P‖X). In the current setting, there is no adaptor capable of avoiding that attack because the attack does not involve
the adaptor at all (the attacker can directly communicate with service 1 via hash?x). However, in a slightly different example
where we can assume that possible attackers cannot actively participate in the system (passive attackers are modelled by
restricting the system communicationswith \L), we had this new formula ((P‖S)\L‖X)\L | psec . In this case, we still obtain
a passive attacker X = χhash,x .
Let usnote thatweare always interested in thepossible communicationsbetween services, adaptors andattackers andnot
in any other external communication. Therefore, we always deal with equations such as (S‖X)\L | pwhere L ⊇ Sort(S‖X)
but we often omit this final restriction (\L) leaving just S‖X | p for the sake of clarity.
5. Securing adaptors through refinement
We are able to synthesise functionally-correct adaptors (Section 3) and verify the resulting adapted system with regard
to a global secrecy property (Section 4). In this section we want to refine the synthesised adaptor to prevent the violation of
such property.
5.1. Refinement
In some cases, a security adaptation contract can be designed to avoid certain attacks but this is limited to the extent
allowed by the service interfaces. A service can be inherently insecure so, if it can be directly accessed by the attacker,
there is no way the adaptor can secure it. However, we can guarantee that the adaptor is resilient to attacks and, when the
deployment scenario allows it, we can use the adaptor as a firewall to the services. In these cases, we are going to refine the
adaptor by removing from its behaviour traces that can be compromised by an attacker.
Given an initial adaptor A0 compliant with a contract C whose environment is E, two languages L (of actions which can
be eavesdropped but cannot be actively accessed by the attacker) and L′ (of actions which can neither be accessed nor
eavesdropped by the attacker), the Crypto-CCS processes of the service S, and an attacker X such that (S‖A0E)\ L′\L‖X |
psec , we define an iterative refinement process over an adaptor Ai and its interface Ri = (,O, s0, F, Ti) by selecting a
minimal trace γ such that Q
γ⇒ Q ′ where Q = (S‖AiE)\ L′\L‖X and Q ′ = Y\ L′\L‖0, and proceeding as follows:
• If (Q γ⇒ Q ′) ↓AiE is empty, then it does not exist an adaptor capable of preserving psec with L and L′ since the attack
did not involve the adaptor. Therefore, the refinement returns the empty adaptor.
• If (Q γ⇒ Q ′) ↓AiE= P0 α1−→ · · · αk−→ Pk , then ip(AiE) presents a unique trace P0 β1−−→ · · · βk−−→ Pk , and it exists a
unique trace s0
β1−−→ · · · βk−−→ sk in ia(A0) (since ip(AiE)  ia(A0)). Then, we iterate considering
ti = (sk−1 βk−−→ sk); Ri+1 = prune(ip(S), Ri, ti)); Ai+1 = ia−1A0 (Ri+1)
The initial adaptor interface is R0 = ia(A0) and we iterate while a trace γ exists satisfying the above conditions. If any of the
prune(ip(S), Ri, ti) is undefined, we return the empty adaptor. When there are no more of such γ traces, at step n, the final
result of the refinement is ia
−1
AC
(Rn). It is worth noting that this iterative process can be used at the same time to synthesise
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Fig. 10. Technical overview of the synthesis of secure security adaptors.
functionally-correct adaptors (i.e., remove deadlocks) being A0 = AC , Qi = S‖AiE and being Q ′i any deadlock state, i.e., Q ′i
is such that ∃γ . Qi γ⇒ Q ′i and γ ′ . Q ′i γ
′⇒ 0where every label in γ and γ ′ is either τ or τc,m.
5.2. Synthesis and refinement overview
With this refinement process we conclude the synthesis of secure security adaptors which is depicted in Fig. 10 and
summarised as follows:
1. Convert service Crypto-CCS process S into its interface, i.e., ip(S).
2. Based on that service interface and a given contract, synthesise (syn) a functionally-correct service adaptor A =
C[ip(S)] as in Section 3.
3. Encode the adaptor into a Crypto-CCS process P = A0E , where E is the environment given in the security adaptation
contract.
4. Verify (Section 4) if there exists an attacker X to S and P, i.e., (S‖P)\ L′\L‖X | psec where psec is the logic expression
of the attack to avoid being restricted by L and L′.
5. Refine (ref) the adaptor A0 based on a possible attacker X (Section 5).
The final result is the adaptor An = ia−1AC (Rn) and its Crypto-CCS process is AnE .
Our approach synthesises, if it exists, an adaptor A for service interfaces ip(S) compliant to contract C and environment
E which preserves a given secrecy property psec . This is formalised as follows.
Theorem5.1. Given a contract C, a process S, and a secrecy property psec (restricted to alphabets L and L
′), the iterative refinement
procedure which provides a sequence of interfaces {Ri}i=0...n (with R0 = ia(C[ip(S)])), satisfies that if Rn =⊥ then A = ia−1AC (Rn)
is an adaptor for services ip(S) compliant with contract C such that property psec is preserved for L and L
′, i.e.:
X . ((AE‖S)\ L′\L‖Xφ)\L′′ | psec
where E is the environment of contract C, L′′ ⊇ Sort(AE‖S)\ L′\L‖Xφ), and φ is the initial knowledge of the attacker.
Example 10. Going back to our running example, being the adaptor process P = AE , we had seen in Example 9 that it
was possible for an attacker to learn the request coming from service 1 (r1) or, more formally, (P‖S)\L‖X | psec being
psec = ∃γ . r1 ∈ KφX,γ is satisfied by an attacker X = χhash,x . This attacker is the result of the verification process (see
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Proposition 4.2). Then, we calculate the trace of synchronisations made by the adaptor during the attack (Q
γ⇒ Q ′) ↓P ,
whose corresponding interface contains the single action:
hash?Id, Req,Nonce,Hash(Id, Req,Nonce, Secret)
During the refinement process, we prune that action from the adaptor interface and then we convert the result into an
adaptor using function ia
−1
A . The resulting adaptor corresponds to the blue bold transitions of Fig. 7. This final adaptor
succeeds in preserving psec because it allows only the use of the public-key protocol where the request r1 is only known
between services 1 and 2. Not even the adaptor, which forwards all the messages between the services, is aware of the
request.
Example 11. Blue bold transitions in the adaptor of our running example are based on the Needham–Schroeder public-
key protocol. This protocol is known to have a flaw where a malicious trusted service can impersonate a third one. In
order to analyse this new scenario, we have to include the attacker X as a trusted insider so we consider the system to be
S = (S1,2 + S1,X)‖(S2,1 + S2,X)‖S3, φX = {iX, i1, Pk(ka), Pk(kb), kx, sX,1, sX,2}where subscripts represent the legal parties
in the communication, e.g., S1,2 represents service 1 talkingwith service 2, r1 and d1 is the request and data for service 1, s1,2
is the secret shared between services 1 and 2, and so on. The contract has to be extended to include allowed communications
between the services and X because X is a trusted service or inside attacker.
Then, as expected, the verification returns an attacker X such that (S‖AE)\L‖X | ∃γ . {r1, d1} ⊆ KφX,γ where L restricts
every channel not prefixed with X . This attacker does not use the hash! action to impersonate another service as it does not
know the shared secret between service 1 and 2. If the attacker tried to use action hash with a random secret, this would
have resulted in a security failure recognised by the adaptor process which would have become 0, therefore stopping all
communications. For this reason, and because of the flaw in the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol, every branch of
attacker X requires going through pk_auth actions on the adaptor.
During the pruning, the adaptor could use actions denied to avoid the attack but the contract enforces that such actions
depend on no_access actions from service 2, so it is not a controllable decision, therefore it is not prunable. The other alter-
native, and the solution for this example, is to prune the adaptor at the pk_auth action, therefore enforcing communications
with X using the hash-based schema. As in Example 9, attacker X is still able to eavesdrop the request r1 but it cannot learn
the reply d1, hence preserving the secrecy property. Such an adaptor corresponds to the non-bold black transitions of the
right-hand side of Fig. 7. 3
6. Related work
There are several other papers [2,13–15,26,29,32] that take advantage of adaptation to support and enhance security.
Mostof them[2,13,14,26,29,32] are compositional approacheswhere security isdynamically changeddependingonruntime
QoS parameters and attack detection. These approaches focus on the performance vs security trade off and, when certain
triggering conditions are met (a mobile agent who goes to a different host, an intruder is detected, or a possible buffer
overflow attack) they tighten the security. This is done by replacing the security components of the systems by another
one previously known and configured. The approach presented in this paper differs radically from theirs as we focus on the
synthesis whereas they do not. Our work could be used in conjunction with theirs to adapt alternative security components
at design time.
Li et al. [15] presented an interesting approach for securing distributed adaptation. In their work, their main focus
is on data adaptation and to synthesise and execute a plan that allows the different parties to distributively apply a set
of data transformations. They present an elaborated middleware, called Conductor, which is in charge of the planning.
More interestingly, it also analyses, asserts and handles the trust between the different services and the different privacy
requirements of each piece of information. They built this security schema based on several security box implementations.
These security boxes wrap the different Conductor-enabled services to provide them with the appropriate cryptographic
capabilities. Such security boxes are pre-designed but interchangeable at run time. Conductor presents a more high-level
solution to a more specific problem. Our approach lacks their dynamic planning as we require static security adaptation
contracts. However, our security adaptors could be used to develop such security boxes with new security protocols. In
addition, Crypto-CCS allows us to describe and verify the different deployment scenarios tackled by Conductor.
The synthesis of security adaptors is analogous to the automatic composition of serviceswith security policies [11]. In this
related work, the authors propose a two-staged approach. TheAVISPA tool is run in each stage: first to obtain the protocol
of the composition and second to verify that it preserves the desired security properties. The latter fits the functionality of
AVISPA and, for the former, the authors converted the goal of the composition into another security property, therefore
using the verifier to obtain an attackerwhich is, instead, the actual protocol of the composition. Although ourwork shares the
3 Actually, the adaptor is the parallel composition of A1,2,3 (the original adaptor mediating between the services of the running example), A1,X,3 (the same
adaptor but replacing service 2 with X) and AX,2,3 (the adaptor which uses X as service 1) because X is an inside attacker included in the adaptation. All of these
are copies of the non-bold black transitions of Fig. 7 but each one has the appropriate initial environment and action prefixes to interact with their corresponding
services.
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motivation and the synthesis-and-verification approach, our proposal goes beyond theirs because (i) our security adaptors
are synthesised to be compliantwith a given contract, sowehave afiner control over the result; and (ii) our approach includes
anovel refinement stagewhere, if any attacker is discoveredduring the verification stage, the adaptor is automatically refined
to be secure against such an attack.
As far as security adaptation contracts describe the allowed interactions among the participants, controller synthesis [16,
19] is another area where security adaptors can be applied. In particular, the synthesis of security controllers is based on
wrapping part of the system and only allowing certain actions to show out of that wrap. Being provided that the deployment
scenario supports that the adaptor completely wrap part of the system, security adaptation contracts can serve for the same
purpose.
In this work, we extended Crypto-CCS [18] for the verification and refinement stages because of its sound verification
algorithm based on partial model checking. However, other verification tools could be employed such as ProVerif [6],
AVISPA [30] orSpi calculus [1]. These approaches should be adapted to support the interfaces given by security adaptation
contracts (via Definition 4.1 and Lemma 4.1) and must provide the most general attacker (Proposition 4.3) so that they can
take advantage of the functionally-correct synthesis (Section 3) and the refinement stages (Section 5) presented in thiswork.
7. Conclusions and future work
We have presented an approach to the synthesis, verification and refinement of secure security adaptors. The desired
interactions between the adaptor and the services, along with the cryptographic operations that must be performed by the
adaptor on every intercepted message, are described in security adaptation contracts. These contracts are able to overcome
incompatibilities in signature, behaviour and security QoS. Based on the contract and the behaviour of the given services, the
adaptor is synthesised to avoid deadlock and livelock situations. On a second step, the synthesised behaviour of the adaptor
is verified and refined using Crypto-CCS to forbid any interaction with the adaptor that can violate the secrecy properties
we want to preserve. At the end of this process we obtain an adaptor robust against attacks to the given secrecy property,
compliant with the given security adaptation contract and able to overcome service incompatibilities. Our approach is
versatile enough to cope with a range of security protocols and deployment scenarios with different zones of trust such as
an attacker which controls the network, a trusted insider or an external attacker which can participate actively or passively
in the communications.
As regards future work, we plan to extend our work with other verification approaches which cover multiple attackers
at the same time. In addition, we want to support adaptor synthesis by untrusted third parties and, in these cases, we plan
to use Proof Carrying Code [23] techniques based on security adaptation contracts.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 2.1. Given an adaptor A compliant with a contract C, ia(A) is a deterministic interface. In addition, if the transition
relation of C presents a tree structure, then ia(A) also presents a tree structure.
Proof.As A is simulated by AC , we only need to prove this result for AC . Indeed, by construction of AC , ia(AC) is a deterministic
tree (see Sections 2.2 and 3.2), and if st ∈ A progresses to two different states st1 and st2 by st αi↪−→ sti(i = 1, 2), then[α1]θ = [α2]θ . Therefore, ia(A) is still deterministic. On the other hand, AC may present different transitions joining two
given states: st
αi
↪−→ st′(i = 1 . . . n), but in that case [α1]θ = · · · = [αn]θ , and then ia(AC) keeps a tree structure. 
Proposition 2.2. Given an adaptor A compliant with a contract whose type substitution is θ then
I  ia(A) ⇒ ia−1A (I)  A
Proof. Let us consider:
I =
(
I,OI, sI0, F
I,
·−→I
)
and A =
(
A,OA, sA0, F
A,
·
↪−→A
)
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In order to distinguish different transition relations in ia(A) and ia−1A (I), wewill denote them by −→ and ↪−→, respectively.
We are going to prove that, given s1 ∈ OI and s2 ∈ OA, if s1 in −→I is simulated by s2 in −→ (s1 I s2), then s1 in ↪−→ is also
simulated by s2 in ↪−→A (s1 A s2); and we will proceed by induction on the transitions departing from s1 in ↪−→.
Base case: If s1  ·↪−→ (there is no transitions from s1), then the only condition of simulation (Definition 2.5) to be checked is
the second one: if s1 is final in ia
−1
A (I), then it is also final in I, and hence s2 is final in ia(A), because s1 I s2. But final
states in ia(A) coincide with final states in A (by construction). Therefore, s2 is also final in A, and we conclude s1 A s2.
Inductive case: Let us assume that s′1 A s′2 (given s′1 I s′2) holds for every s′1 such that s1 α↪−→ s′1 for some α ∈ A. Then,
by construction of ia
−1
A (I), we have that both s1
α
↪−→I s′1 and s1 [α]θ−−−→I s′1. As s1 I s2, s2 [α]θ−−−→ s′2 for some s′2 such that
s′1 I s′2. By induction hypothesis s′1 A s′2, and also s2 α↪−→A s′2, because s2 [α]θ−−−→ s′2 in ia(A). 
Lemma 3.1. The contract transformation given by rule Dep satisfies that:
• Every adaptor compliant to CE is also compliant to C.
• For every trace of CE such as s0 v0−−→C . . . si vi−→C si+1 vi+1−−−→C it holds that
pm∧(vi+1) ⊆ Dom(κE) ∪
j=i⋃
j=0
pmf (vj) ∪ pm∗(vj)
Proof. The proof is trivial following the rules in Fig. 8 and the definition of adaptors (Definition 2.6). 
Proposition 3.1. Function prune is independent of the pruning order. More formally, given two interfaces S and I, and two
transitions t1 and t2 in I, we have:
prune(S, prune(S, I, t1), t2) = prune(S, prune(S, I, t2), t1)
Proof. Let I1 = prune(S, I, t1) and I2 = prune(S, I, t2), T1 and T2 their corresponding transition relations, and P =
prunable(S, I). If I1 is undefined (⊥), then the result is trivial, if we consider prune(S,⊥, t) =⊥, because if there is no t′ ∈ P
satisfying the pruning condition for t1 in I will neither exist a such transition in prunable(S, I2), since prunable(S, I2) ⊆ P.
The symmetrical reasoning could be made if I2 =⊥. Thus, we can suppose both I1 and I2 are not undefined.
Let us consider t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2). If t ∈ T2, it would exist t′ ∈ P such that a trace exists, u˜ = · · · t′ · t˜ · t2 · · · ∈ O[I],
where t˜ ∩ P = ∅ and t is included in t˜ or after t2. As t ∈ T1, u˜ ∈ O[I1]. Now, if we consider P1 = prunable(S, I1), we have
two alternatives:
(1) t′ ∈ P1. Then, t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2).
(2) t′ ∈ P1. Clearly, t˜ ∩ P1 = ∅ because P1 ⊆ P, and t˜ ∩ P = ∅. Therefore, one of the following conditions holds:
(a) There exists t′′ preceding t′ in u˜ such that t′′ ∈ P1, and then transition t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2).
(b) Otherwise, prune(S, I1, t2) is undefined, and trivially, t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2).
Thus, we have proved that t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2) implies t ∈ T2.
Let us suppose that t ∈ prune(S, I2, t1). Then, there exists a transition t′ ∈ P2 = prunable(S, I2) such that a trace exists,
u˜ = · · · t′ · t˜ · t1 · · · ∈ O[I2], where t˜ ∩ P2 = ∅ and t is after t′ (i.e., it has been pruned). If t is after t1, then t ∈ T1 because
t′ ∈ P1 ⊆ P (that is, it was already pruned by I1), and t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2), such as it was assumed initially. Therefore,
t˜ = u˜1 · t · u˜2. But, as we have already mentioned, by hypothesis, t ∈ T1, and then u˜1 ∩ P = ∅. Thus, to prune t1 in I2,
it must exist t′′ ∈ P after t, i.e., such that u˜2 = u˜2′t′′u˜2′′, with u˜2′′ ∩ P = ∅. But, t˜ ∩ P2 = ∅, hence t′′ ∈ P2, and the
only way to have a transition t′′ prunable in I but not prunable in I2 is because (see definition of prunable mapping) some
branch previous to t′′, and reaching t2 has been pruned in T2. As t is still in T2, we can find t′′′ ∈ P in u˜1 · t · u˜2′ such
that a trace u˜′ = · · · t′u˜1 · tt˜1 · t′′′ · t˜2 · t2 · · · ∈ O[I] exists, coinciding with u˜ until t˜1, satisfying t˜2 ∩ P = ∅. If u˜′ ∈ T1,
t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2); then u˜′ ∈ T1. Taking into account that transitions after t′′ in u˜ are not in T1, we have that t′ (or some
previous transition) is in P1 and t˜ ∩ P1 = ∅ (if they are not, by considering definition of prunable mapping, t′ ∈ P2 or
t˜ ∩ P2 = ∅, which are the case). Thus, we conclude that there exists t′ ∈ P1 such that u˜′ = · · · t′ · t˜′ · t2 · · · ∈ O[I1] with
t˜′ ∩ P1 = ∅, and t is included in t˜′. In fact, this is true for t˜′ = u˜1 · t · t˜1 · t′′′ · t˜2, because u˜1 · t · t˜1 ∩ P1 = ∅ (since u˜1 · t · t˜1 is
a subtrace of t˜), and also t˜2 ∩ P1 = ∅ (since P1 ⊆ P and t˜2 ∩ P = ∅). However, at this point, we get a contradiction because
t ∈ prune(S, I1, t2). 
Lemma 3.2. For any service interface S and any transition t of an adaptor A, if prune(S, ia(A), t) =⊥ then
ia
−1
A (prune (S, ia(A), t))  A
and prune(S, ia(A), t) is deterministic.
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Proof. We know that for every S, I and t such that prune(S, I, t) =⊥ it happens that prune(S, I, t)  I because function
prune only removes transitions from I. Then, by applying Proposition 2.2 we obtain ia
−1
A (prune(S, ia(A), t)  A. For the
same reason (transitions in the pruned interface are a subset of transitions in ia(A)), prune(S, ia(A), t) is also deterministic
because ia(A) is deterministic. 
Theorem 3.1. Given a contract C, the iterative pruning process for a certain interface S, providing the sequence of interfaces
{Ii}i=0...n (with I0 = ia(AC)), satisfies that if In =⊥ then ia−1AC (In) is an adaptor for services S compliant with contract C.
Proof. Given an interface S and a contract C, if we consider the interface generated in each step i of the pruning process
Ii = prune(S, Ii−1, t), we can prove that it satisfies
ia
−1
AC
(prune(S, Ii, t))  AC and Ii  ia(AC)
if Ii =⊥ (i = 0, . . . , n − 1), being I0 = ia(AC). In fact, by Lemma 3.2, this is true for n = 0. If we proceed by induction
on i, and we assume as inductive hypothesis ia
−1
AC
(prune(S, Ii−1, t))  AC and Ii−1  ia(AC), then we can derive the result
by applying Proposition 2.2. Thus, the resulting adaptor (if it is not empty) at the end of the process is still compliant with
the contract C. Additionally, every deadlock avoidable by the adaptor is removed by the pruning process, which does not
generate new deadlocks, and this process converges because prune is a monotonically decreasing function (w.r.t. transitions
in the adaptor). 
Lemma 4.1. Two Crypto-CCS processes which do not eavesdrop synchronise iff their corresponding interfaces synchronise. More
formally,
P‖Q α−→ P′‖Q ′, α ∈ {τc,m, τ } iff ip(P) ⊗ ip(Q) τ−→ ip(P′) ⊗ ip(Q ′)
Proof. Synchronisation among services which does not eavesdrop occur by rule ‘‖2’ (described in Table 1). The condition
of this rule requires the transitions of the two services to be labelled with the same message, thus the transitions have the
same type and by extension, they present the same interface. 
Proposition 4.1. Given a system S and an agent Xφ where φ is finite and Sort(S‖X) ⊆ L, then if m is an initial message we have:
S||
L
Xφ | ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ iff Xφ | ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S.
Proof. This result corresponds to Proposition 4.3 in [18]. 
Proposition 4.2. Consider the formula F = ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S. Then it is decidable whether or not a model X of such formula
exists.
Proof. We prove the thesis by structural induction on S and F; furthermore, if F is satisfiable, we construct a model XF for
such a formula.
• F = F. Then, no sequential agent models F , and thus F is not satisfiable.
• F = T. Then, every sequential agent models F . Let (XF)φ be (0)φ .• Then F is the disjunction of several formulas, say F = F1 ∨ F2 ∨ F3 ∨ F4 ∨ F5. Each of these formulas corresponds to a
behaviour of X as it follows from the partial model checking table. At least one of these formulas must be satisfiable, if F
is satisfiable. For each satisfiable formula Fi, with i = 1 . . . 5, we built a process Xi and as XF we consider the summation
of these processes.
– F1 = ∨(c,m′,S′)∈Send(S)〈c!m′〉(∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S′).
* Consider the set of formulas F1,S′ = (∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S′) that are satisfiable and consider for each of them the
corresponding synthesised process XF1,S′ (by structural induction on S this must hold). This set cannot be empty
otherwise F1 is not satisfiable. For any c,m
′ there is atmost one S′ s.t. (c,m′, S′) ∈ Send(S) s.t.XF1,S′ is a synthesised
model. Then let X1,S′ be (p.c!x.X′F1,S′ )φ , where: (1) p is a proof of m from φ whose root is an assignment to the
variable x; (2) x is a variable that does not appear in XF1,S′ ; (3) X
′
F1,S′ is the term XF1,S′ wherem is replaced with x.
We then consider as X1 the summation of all these processes.
– F2 = ∨
S
c!m′−→S′ 〈c?m
′〉(∃γ . m ∈ Kφ∪{m′}X,γ //S′)
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* Fix c s.t. exists m′, S′ with (∃γ . m ∈ Kφ∪{m′}X,γ //S′) satisfiable. By induction we can find XF2,m′,S′ that satisfy that
formula. Consider a variable x that is not present in any of these processes. Then, let X2,c′ be c?x : T .Y , where Y is
the summation of summands of the form [x = m′]X′F2,m′ .S′ , where X′2,m′.S′ is X2,m′.S′ where m′ is replaced with x
(assuming x is fresh). Eventually, X2 is the summation on all c for which a satisfiable formula exists.
– F3 = ∨
S
τ
c,m′−→S′
〈χc,m′ 〉(∃γ . m ∈ Kφ∪{m
′}
X,γ //S
′)
* This case proceeds analogously to F2.
– F4 = ∨
S
τ
c,m′ ,τ−→ S′
∃γ . m ∈ Kφγ //S′
* This case is subsumed by F3 where the eavesdropped message is actually included in the knowledge of X .
– F5 = m ∈ KφX,//S. This is the base case. 
Proposition 4.3. Given a system S. Assume that an agent Xφ , with a finite φ and Sort(S‖X) ⊆ L, then if m is an initial message
and ((S‖X) \ L γ⇒ S1) ↓X= γ ′ and m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′)) and m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′′), for any γ ′′ strict prefix of γ ′, then
also ((S‖XF) \ L γ⇒ S2) ↓XF= γ ′ and m ∈ D(φ ∪msgs(γ ′)), where XF is the process obtained in the proof of Proposition 4.2
for the formula F = ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the length of γ .
• γ is empty. Then also (XF)φ is s.t.m ∈ D(φ).• γ = αγ1. We can then investigate on the nature of the action α.
– α = τ . Then, ((S‖X) \ L τ−→ (S′‖X) \ L γ1⇒ S1) ↓X= γ ′ and m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′)) and m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′′),
for any γ ′′ strict prefix of γ ′. By structural induction on γ1 we know that also XF ′ can perform the same sequence γ ′,
where F ′ = ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S′. Since XF ′ would be one summand of XF , the result follows.
– α = τc!m′ . We can have four cases:
* The action is due to a sending from X and a reception from S. Then it must be that m′ ∈ D(φ) and (S,m′, S′) ∈
Send(S). It means that ((S‖X) \ L τc,m′−→ (S′‖X′) \ L γ1⇒ S1) ↓X= (c!m′)γ ′ and m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′)) and
m ∈ D(φ ∪ msgs(γ ′′), for any γ ′′ strict prefix of (c!m′)γ ′.
By structural induction on γ1 we know that also XF ′ (XF1,S′ in the terminology of Proposition 4.2) can perform the
same sequence γ ′, where F ′ = ∃γ . m ∈ KφX,γ //S′. Since (p.c!x.X′F1,S′ )φ , where: (1) p is a proof of m′ from φ and
X′F1,S′ is the term XF1,S′ , i.e., XF ′ wherem
′ is replaced with x, would be one summand of XF , the result follows.
* The action is due to a receiving form X and sending from S. Then it means that S
c!m′−→ S′ and ((S‖X) \ L τc,m′−→
(S′‖X′) \ L γ1⇒ S1) ↓X= (c?m′)γ ′ and m ∈ D(φ ∪ {m′}msgs(γ ′)) andm ∈ D(φ ∪msgs(γ ′′), for any γ ′′ strict
prefix of (c?m′)γ ′.
By structural induction on γ1 we know that alsoXF ′ (XF2,m′,S′ in the terminology of Proposition 4.2) can perform the
same sequence γ ′, where F ′ = ∃γ .m ∈ Kφ∪{m′}X,γ //S′. Since c?x : T .(. . .+ ([x = m′]X′F2,m′ .S′ )+ . . .), where X′2,m′.S′
is X2,m′.S′ wherem′ is replaced with x (assuming x is fresh) would be one summand of XF , the result follows.
* The action is internal synchronisation of S and it is eavesdropped by X . This is similar to the previous case.
* The action is internal synchronisation of S and it is not eavesdropped by X . Similar to the case with τ . 
Theorem5.1. Given a contract C, a process S, and a secrecy property psec (restricted to alphabets L and L
′), the iterative refinement
procedure which provides a sequence of interfaces {Ri}i=0...n (with R0 = ia(C[ip(S)])), satisfies that if Rn =⊥ then A = ia−1AC (Rn)
is an adaptor for services ip(S) compliant with contract C such that property psec is preserved for L and L
′, i.e.:
X . ((AE‖S)\ L′\L‖Xφ)\L′′ | psec
where E is the environment of contract C, L′′ ⊇ Sort(AE‖S)\ L′\L‖Xφ), and φ is the initial knowledge of the attacker.
Proof. C[ip(S)] is the adaptor resulting of applying the iterative pruning process in Section 3. Then, by Theorem 3.1 we
have that R0  AC . Thus, If we proceed as in Theorem 3.1, we can prove that A = ia−1AC (Rn) is still an adaptor for services
ip(S) compliant with contract C. This is because the nature of the transitions pruned by mapping prune was not used to
reason about the resulting interfaces; that is, it does not matter if the pruned transition exhibited a deadlock situation when
interacted with ip(S) or permitted an attack from some X . On the other hand, by construction AE preserves the property
psec such as it is stated; in fact, for each step of the refinement process, if (ia
−1
AC
(Ri)E‖S)\ L′\L presents a trace which allows
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an attack, the transition in Ri corresponding to the last interaction is pruned. In addition, by Proposition 4.3, we know that
the avoided attacker is the most general one; and therefore, by disabling it (by successively pruning vulnerable traces), we
disable any other possible attack. 
Appendix B. From adaptors to Crypto-CCS
We now proceed to give some definitions to be able to encode adaptors into Crypto-CCS processes. The inference rules
of IS needed to compose and decompose the value of a contract term are unambiguously given by the contract term. This
assumptions boils down to two functions dependant on IS: evIS and outIS.
Function evIS is in charge of replacing every symbolic parameters using substitution σ and evaluate the resulting ex-
pression. In this section, substitutions σ, ρ and κ replace parameters with the Crypto-CCS variables which represent their
values.
For IS in Fig. 3 it is necessary to define the following evIS function.
evIS(T, σ, θ) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(0, σ (P)) if T = P
(Q [〈〈y〉〉 1 υx :[T ]θ ], x) if
{ T = Hash(T1),
(Q , y) = evIS(T1, σ, θ)
(Q1 . . .Qn
[〈〈y1 . . . yn〉〉 3 υx :[T ]θ ], x) if
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T = (T1 . . . Tn),
(Qi, yi) = evIS(Ti, σ, θ),
i ∈ [1, n]
(Q1.Q2
[〈〈y1, y2〉〉 5 υx :[T ]θ ], x) if
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T = Enc(T1, T2),
(Q1, y1) = evIS(T1, σ, θ),
(Q2, y2) = evIS(T2, σ, θ)
(Q1.Q2
[〈〈y1, y2〉〉 2 υx :[T ]θ ], x) if
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T = AEncc(T1, T2),
(Q1, y1) = evIS(T1, σ, θ),
(Q2, y2) = evIS(T2, σ, θ)
We denote by υx a new variable x not used in the rest of the process.
Function outIS is dependant on the inference systemused. It plays a complementary role to evIS in the sense that it obtains
what is inside a constructor (the cleartext of some encrypted message or the elements of a list, for instance) as opposed to
evaluating a structured contract term. Being given a symbolic parameter P, a composite contract term T, a variable x which
contains the value corresponding to T and substitutions σ and θ , outIS returns the process able to obtain the value of what
is contained within T, the variable that will be replaced with that value, and the contract term corresponding to the content.
For IS in Fig. 3, function outIS is defined as
outIS(P, T, x, σ, θ) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
([〈〈x〉〉 4i υy :[Ti]θ ],Ti, y) if
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
T = (. . .Tj . . .Ti . . . ),
reach(P,Ti),
¬reach(P,Tj)
(
Q .[〈〈z, x〉〉 6 υy :[T2]θ ],T2, y) if
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
T = Enc(T1,T2),
reach(P,T2),
(Q , z) = evIS(T1, σ, θ)
(
Q .[〈〈z, x〉〉 7 υy :[T2]θ ],T2, y) if
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
T = AEncd(T1,T2),
[T1]θ = Pk(T),
reach(P,T2),
(Q , z) = evIS(T1, σ, θ)
(
Q .[〈〈z, x〉〉 8 υy :[T2]θ ],T2, y) if
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
T = AEncd(T1,T2),
[T1]θ = Pk(T)
reach(P,T2),
(Q , z) = evIS(T1, σ, θ)
⊥ otherwise
Function reach (see [17]) is true iff the value of the given parameter can be obtained from the given contract term.
Being given the value of a contract term and the value of its known parameters, the value of all its fresh parameters can
be obtained using Crypto-CCS. The value of the fresh parameters in the contract term can be obtained using function gets
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defined as follows:
gets(〈〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉〉, x, ρ0, κ, θ)  (Q1 . . .Qn, ρn) (gets)
where (Qi, ρi) = get(Pi, x, ρi−1, κ, θ)
Function get is defined as follows:
get(P, T, x, ρ, κ, θ) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(0, ρ  [x/P]) if T = P
(
Q .R, ρ′
)
if
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
T = F(T1, . . . , Tar(F)),(
Q , T ′, y
)
= outIS(P, T, x, ρ f  κ∧, θ),(
R, ρ′
)
= get(P, T ′, y, ρ, κ, θ)
⊥ otherwise
The security check expressed in contract terms can be performed using Crypto-CCS. Contract terms of input actions have
known parameters to represent that, whatever is received in that action, should partially match with what is contained in
those parameters. If we have a variable xwhich is bounded to the message received through contract term T, using function
get, we can obtain the value of fresh symbolic parameters in T. Then, we can evaluate T (through function evIS) but using the
known expected parameters filling the gapswith the received fresh parameters.With this evaluationwe obtain the expected
value x′. Finally, we only have to compare the expected value against the actual received value using Crypto-CCS guards, i.e.,
[x = x′].
Security adaptors for sequential agents can be encoded into Crypto-CCS processes. Using the previous definitions, the
Crypto-CCS process corresponding to a security adaptor
(
, S, s0, F,
.−→A) compliant with a contract whose environment is
(θ, κ), is given by s0(θ,κ) defined as follows:
• s(θ,κ)  0 if s ∈ F .
• s(θ,κ)  ∑
P∈B
P where B = {s α↪−→ s′(θ,κ) | ∀α, s′ : s α↪−→ s′} if s ∈ F .
• s c!T−−→A s′(θ,κ)  P.c!x.Q where
– (P, x) = evalIS(T, κ∧, θ).
– Q = s′(θ,κ).
• s c?T−−→A s′(θ,κ)  c?υx :[T ]θ .P.Q .[x = y].Rwhere
– (P, ρ) = gets(pmf (T ), x, ε, κ).
– (Q , y) = evalIS(T, ρ f  κ∧, θ).
– R = s′(θ,κρ).
The empty substitution is denoted by ε.
Appendix C. Convert security contracts into deadlock-equivalent behavioural contracts
C.1. Abstracting security away
As seen in Section 3.1, the data dependencies among the symbolic parameters in a security contract C can be explicitly
included in the contract CE . Additionally, by Lemma 4.1, we can avoid altogether contract terms in order to do the synthesis
of functionally-correct adaptors. So, if we want to use traditional approaches to adaptor synthesis (where no security or
symbolic parameters are supported), we can include the interface information in the channel of the actions. Therefore, we
have to transform the contract and the service interfaces to another contract and service interfaces without security in a
way that the transformation can be reversed once the adaptor is synthesised. More formally, the contract transformation
is defined in Fig. C.11b. Single-sided vector transformation is omitted. Symbol ‘?!’ represents either ‘?’ or ‘!’. We use the
calligraphic letter C to denote the equivalent contract without security and, similarly, for the statemachinewhich it imposes
to the adaptor, i.e., AC being the synthesised adaptor A. We proceed analogously for services, i.e., for every s1
c ?!S−−−→ s2 we
have s1
c_S ?!−−−→ s2. Let us highlight that the obtained services and contract without security are just particular cases of our
service interfaces and contracts, therefore we can use our previous results.
We can now use any compatible approach to the synthesis of behavioural adaptors [7,9,10,21,24] to generate an adaptor
without security A such that it complies with C and the security-less services. We will follow the procedure depicted in
Fig. C.11a.
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Fig. C.11. Rules to remove and include security into adaptation contracts.
C.2. Including security back into the adaptor
The transformation from C to C (AC to AC, analogously) is reversible because both state machines are deterministic and
use the same set of states. However, the synthesised secure-less adaptor Amight not use the same set of states so, in order
to obtain its corresponding adaptor with security (A), we need to define a procedure to undo the transformation.
Fig. C.11c returns adaptor A using the equivalence relation between AC andAC while simulatingA. The initial state of A is
the one which corresponds to the initial state of AC and AC. The final states of A are those which correspond to final states
of A.
References
[1] M. Abadi, A.D. Gordon, A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus, in: Proc. of CCS’97, ACM, 1997, pp. 36–47.
[2] M. Alia, M. Lacoste, A QoS and security adaptation model for autonomic pervasive systems, in: Proc. of COMPSAC’08, IEEE, 2008, pp. 943–948.
[3] H.R. Andersen, Partial model checking (extended abstract), in: Proc. of LICS’95, IEEE Computer, 1995, pp. 398–407.
[4] T. Andrews et al., Business Process Execution Language for Web Services (WSBPEL), BEA Systems, IBM, Microsoft, SAP AG, and Siebel Systems, 2005.
[5] L. Baresi, E.D. Nitto, C. Ghezzi, Toward open-world software: issues and challenges, Computer 39 (10) (2006) 36–43.
[6] B. Blanchet, Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols, Computer Security 17 (4) (2009) 363–434.
[7] A. Brogi, C. Canal, E. Pimentel, Measuring component adaptation, in: Proc. of COORDINATION’04, LNCS, vol. 2949, Springer, 2004, pp. 71–86.
[8] A. Brogi, C. Canal, E. Pimentel, On the semantics of software adaptation, Sci. Comput. Programming 61 (2) (2006) 136–151.
[9] J. Cámara, J.A. Martín, G. Salaün, J. Cubo, M. Ouederni, C. Canal, E. Pimentel, ITACA: an integrated toolbox for the automatic composition and adaptation of
web services, in: Proc. of ICSE’09, IEEE Computer, 2009, pp. 627–630.
[10] C. Canal, P. Poizat, G. Salaün, Model-based adaptation of behavioural mismatching components, IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 34 (4) (2008) 546–563.
[11] Y. Chevalier, M.A. Mekki, M. Rusinowitch, Automatic composition of services with security policies, in: Proceedings of the 2008
IEEE Congress on Services – Part I, SERVICES ’08, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2008, pp. 529–537. Available from:
http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SERVICES-1.2008.13.
[12] P. Degano, C. Priami, Enhanced operational semantics: a tool for describing and analyzing concurrent systems, ACM Comput. Surv. 33 (2001) 135–176.
[13] H. Hinton, C. Cowan, L. Delcambre, S. Bowers, SAM: security adaptation manager, in: Proc. of ACSAC’99, IEEE, 1999, pp. 361–370.
[14] A. Klenk, M. Masekowsky, H. Niedermayer, G. Carle, ESAF – an extensible security adaptation framework, in: Proc. of NordSec’05, 2005.
[15] J. Li, M. Yarvis, P. Reiher, Securing distributed adaptation, Comput. Networks 38 (3) (2002) 347–371.
[16] O. Maler, A. Pnueli, J. Sifakis, On the synthesis of discrete controllers for timed systems, in: Proc. of STACS’95, LNCS, vol. 900, Springer, 2005, pp. 229–242.
[17] J.A. Martín, E. Pimentel, Contracts for security adaptation, JLAP 80 (3–5) (2011) 154–179.
[18] F. Martinelli, Analysis of security protocols as open systems, TCS 290 (1) (2003) 1057–1106.
[19] F. Martinelli, I. Matteucci, A framework for automatic generation of security controller, STVR.
[20] F. Martinelli, M. Petrocchi, A. Vaccarelli, Automated analysis of some security mechanisms of scep, in: Proc. of ISC’02, 2002, pp. 414–427.
[21] R. Mateescu, P. Poizat, G. Salaün, Adaptation of service protocols using process algebra and on-the-fly reduction techniques, in: Proc. of ICSOC’08, LNCS,
Springer, 2008, pp. 84–99.
[22] R. Milner, Communication and Concurrency, Prentice-Hall, 1989.
[23] G.C. Necula, P. Lee, Safe, Untrusted agents using proof-carrying code, in: Mobile Agents and Security, 1998, pp. 61–91.
[24] L. Padovani, Contract-based discovery and adaptation of web services, in: SFM’09, 2009, pp. 213–260.
[25] M.P. Papazoglou, P. Traverso, S. Dustdar, F. Leymann, Service-oriented computing: state of the art and research challenges, Computer 40 (11) (2007) 38–45.
[26] D.J. Ragsdale, C.A. Carver, J.W. Humphries, U.W. Pooch, Adaptation techniques for intrusion detection and intrusion response systems, Proc. of SAM’00, vol.
4, IEEE, 2000, pp. 2344–2349.
[27] K. Scribner, Microsoft Windows Workflow Foundation: Step by Step, Microsoft Press, 2007.
[28] M. Sipser, Introduction to the Theory of Computation, International Thomson Publishing, 1996.
[29] F. Sñnchez-Cid, A. Maña, G. Spanoudakis, C. Kloukinas, D. Serrano, A. Muñoz, Security and Dependability for Ambient Intelligence, Springer, 2009, pp. 69–95
(Chapter 5).
[30] L. Viganò, Automated security protocol analysis with the avispa tool, ENTCS 155 (2006) 69–86.
[31] D.M. Yellin, R.E. Strom, Protocol specifications and components adaptors, ACM Trans. Programming Lang. Systems 19 (2) (1997) 292–333.
[32] W. Zhi, G. Zhogwen, A dynamic security adaptation mechanism for mobile agents, in: Proc. of ICC’09, 2004, pp. 334–339.
